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DEVOLUTION, GOVERNANCE AND
THE PEACE PROCESS
Paul Carmichael and Colin Knox
School of Policy Studies, University of Ulster,
Jordanstown, Northern Ireland
Devolution and the associated mechanisms of governance—a
power-sharing Executive, elected assembly, cross-border bodies,
a reformed system of public administration and civic engagement
—are a part of the wider mosaic of peace-building. Their imple-
mentation is an attempt to institutionalize stability and copper-
fasten a political settlement. This article outlines the changing
governmental arrangements existing within Northern Ireland, as
it has shifted tentatively away from direct rule. It maps the wider
public sector in Northern Ireland, including civil administration
(chiefly the Northern Ireland Civil Service), an extended mosaic
of nondepartmental public bodies (NDPBs) and other public
agencies that, together with local government, form a complex,
multi-layered, subregional governance. Our contention is that
the manner in which the administration of Northern Ireland has
been conducted yields fruitful insights into issues of territorial
management in other areas afflicted by intractable constitutional
wrangles and attendant violence. In short, an agreed system of
governance is integral to the transition from conflict to peace (or
at least stability) and, in the case of Northern Ireland, was central
to the substance of the Belfast Agreement, characterized by a
power-sharing Executive.
INTRODUCTION
Few places in the western world have attracted the level of intense
political, media and academic scrutiny as has been lavished on
Northern Ireland, so synonymous is it with political violence and
terrorism. Inevitably, the spotlight has gravitated towards more
immediate symptoms of its intercommunal ethno-national strife
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and, of late, the tortuous trail of acrimonious negotiations in the
‘peace process’. Consequently, the routine business of government
has received rather less attention, notwithstanding some notable
exceptions.1 However, there are fundamental aspects of the way in
which Northern Ireland has been governed and its wider system of
public administration that do merit inspection.
When Ireland was partitioned in 1920, Northern Ireland remained
an integral part of the United Kingdom (UK). Ever since, it has
broadly been governed in accordance with British administrative pre-
cepts, although considerable differences have co-existed reflecting
prevailing local conditions. Largely, any divergence from established
norms in the UK reflects how the province is ‘a place apart’ and
‘special case’, wherein the British state ‘governs without consensus’.2
Northern Ireland was never envisaged as a shared political construct
or as Northern Ireland’s first Prime Minister, James Craig, put it ‘all I
boast is that we are a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant state’.3
To secure this, from its foundation in 1921 until the suspension of
Stormont in 1972, the Ulster Unionists formed the Government
of Northern Ireland and made no attempt to share power with
Catholics. In turn, Catholics deepened the antagonism of Unionists
by refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the Stormont regime, which
led to an indifferent minority population, and the determination of
the majority to monopolize power.4 Birch put this more succinctly:
‘For 50 years Northern Ireland had a political system in which a per-
manent majority nursed their power and a permanent minority
nursed their grievances’.5
Geographically separate and politically distinct from Great
Britain, Northern Ireland’s semi-detached character is reinforced by
its proximity to the Republic of Ireland with which it enjoys a conten-
tious relationship, especially following the Anglo-Irish Agreement
(1985) and subsequent role for Irish civil servants in mediating
Northern Ireland’s affairs. Idiosyncratic though these various admin-
istrative arrangements can be, they have functioned satisfactorily
albeit problematically and controversially. Indeed, the relative stab-
ility and continuity in the administration of key public services
undoubtedly helped fashion some semblance of normality for the
besieged population.
Thus, this article does two things. It outlines the changing
governmental arrangements existing within Northern Ireland, as it
has shifted tentatively away from Direct Rule. In particular, it
focuses on the institutional novelties of the devolved settlement that
was established for Northern Ireland’s internal affairs as part of the
Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement in 1998, as well as those of a
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cross-border (north-south) and pan-British Isles (east-west) nature,
which together have been styled ‘devolution-plus’.6 It maps the wider
public sector in Northern Ireland, including civil administration
(chiefly the Northern Ireland Civil Service), an extended mosaic of
nondepartmental public bodies (NDPBs) and other public agencies
that, together with local government, form a complex multi-layered
subregional governance. This analysis also includes consideration of
the changing nature of governance involving the development of
partnership arrangements, which have received an important boost
as a result of the emerging European dimension of governance.
Our contention is that the manner in which the administration of
Northern Ireland has been conducted yields fruitful insights into
issues of territorial management in other areas afflicted by intractable
constitutional wrangles and attendant violence. In short, an agreed-
upon system of governance is integral to the transition from conflict
to peace (or at least stability) and, in the case of Northern Ireland,
was central to the substance of the Belfast Agreement, characterized
by a power-sharing Executive.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FROM DIRECT RULE
TO DEVOLUTION
Governing Without Consensus
Unionist dominance in Northern Ireland during the period
19211972 resulted in what Whyte described as a ‘consistent and
irrefutable pattern of deliberate discrimination against Catholics’ in
electoral practices, public employment, policing, public employment,
public housing and regional policy, respectively.7 These grievances
led to the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement which sought to
redress discrimination through public protest in the form of demon-
strations and marches. In 1968, one such march in (London) Derry
protested that the majority Catholic city was gerrymandered in such
a way as to be run by Protestants. The march met with a violent reac-
tion from the police and Protestant mobs. In response, the Unionist
Prime Minister, Terence O’Neill, announced a program of reform—a
points system for housing allocations, an Ombudsman, the repeal of
the Special Powers Act (legislation passed in 1922 to deal with illegal
political activities), ‘one man, one vote’ (sic) for local elections, and
an independent housing executive.
The reforms enraged Protestants without appeasing Catholics and
although intercommunal violence quelled in the short term, disunity
among the Unionists began to emerge. Prime Minister O’Neill
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resigned in 1969 suffering a loss in support from the Unionist rank-
and-file and his parliamentary party for conciliatory overtones to
Nationalists. Militant Nationalists=Republicans and Loyalist terror
groups then engaged in campaigns of violence. This led to the British
Government authorizing the deployment of units of the armed forces
in support of the civil power. Several political and military blunders
followed, from internment without trial through ‘political status’ for
Irish Republican Army (IRA) prisoners, to the shooting of 13 demon-
strators at an anti-internment march in (London)Derry (Bloody Sun-
day  30 January 1972). In March 1972, with intercommunal
violence and terrorist action continuing, the British Government
suspended the regional parliament at Stormont and introduced Direct
Rule from Westminster.8
After the former Stormont arrangements were prorogued and
Direct Rule from London was imposed in 1972, successive British
Governments sought to restore a form of devolved power-sharing
administration that commanded widespread cross-community accep-
tance. However, save for the ill-fated ‘Sunningdale’ experiment of
197374, the temporary expedient of Direct Rule endured, whereby
the Secretary of State (a UK cabinet minister) and up to four minis-
ters of state, exercised direction and control over the Northern
Ireland Office (NIO) and the central government departments of
Northern Ireland. Much of the paraphernalia of Stormont remained
in situ.9 The ‘change to direct rule was accomplished without any
interruption in the day-to-day business of government’10 and ‘all that
was left was the ritual of an orderly and responsible take over’.11
A ‘democratic deficit’ arose because neither the secretary of state
nor his=her junior ministerial team represented a parliamentary con-
stituency in Northern Ireland. Ministers had ‘a nonelective relation-
ship with the recipients of policy’.12 Northern Ireland legislation
was dealt with through Parliamentary Statutory Instruments rather
than full bills at Westminster. Accountability, already tenuous, was
undermined further by the fact that no select committee existed for
Northern Ireland business (unlike for that of the Scottish and Welsh
offices). Only in 1993, as part of a ‘deal’ to ensure the continuing sup-
port of Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)MPs for JohnMajor’s embattled
Conservative Government was a Northern Ireland Affairs Commit-
tee established. The early performances of Northern Ireland Civil
Service officials before parliamentary scrutiny quickly exposed their
relative inexperience of dealing with politicians’ oversight.13
While the immediate circumstances were rather different to those
obtaining in Great Britain, Northern Ireland’s experience of both
devolution (under Stormont) and Direct Rule was considered in what
596 P. Carmichael and C. Knox
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Sw
et
s 
Co
nt
en
t 
Di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
] 
At
: 
11
:2
4 
30
 M
ar
ch
 2
01
0
Connolly and Loughlin termed an ‘adoption or adaptation’ conti-
nuum.14 They argued that as Northern Ireland is an integral part
of the UK, the policy agenda is determined, in part at least, by the
concerns of that wider polity. On the other hand, given the unique
political environment, regional networks exist that adapt Whitehall
policies to suit the circumstances of Northern Ireland. Thus, since
policy uniformity with administrative diversity has long been the
norm with the British ‘union state’ tradition, Northern Ireland’s
political masters (be they the old Unionist Party or London-based
ministers) basically followed Westminster and Whitehall, albeit tail-
oring their policy prescriptions to suit local conditions, thereby secur-
ing ‘parity with particularity’. However, as Gaffikin and Morrissey
noted, the concept of ‘adoption’ assumed the application of uniform
policies through the UK even though that was often not the case.15
Instead, they spoke of adaptation within a standard framework of
theories, policies and structures. Loughlin went further, contending
that policy-making in Northern Ireland could be viewed as ‘a con-
tinuum going from a high degree of convergence to a high degree
of divergence’ from UK practice.16 Ultimately, of course, for Direct
Rule ministers, ensuring the ‘good government’ of Northern Ireland
amounted to ‘holding the line’, pending a resolution of the ‘troubles’.
The ‘Peace Process’
Since the inception of Direct Rule in 1972, the stated aim of suc-
cessive UK administrations was to seek peace, stability and pros-
perity for the people of Northern Ireland, within a framework of
harmonious relations with the rest of the UK, the Republic of Ireland
and the European Union. A senior NIO official described this
approach as follows:
. Promoting Agreement among all people who live on the island of
Ireland working with the Irish Government to that end;
. A cooperative and coherent approach to all aspects of government
policy in Northern Ireland which recognizes that the fundamental
political, security, economic and social problems are closely inter-
related; and,
. Policies informed by the principles of equality of opportunity,
equity of treatment and parity of esteem, irrespective of political,
cultural or religious affiliation of gender.17
What is important about this approach is the recognition that addres-
sing political problems at the macro level is, in itself, insufficient. The
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role of the state in coping with political violence was changing from
an exclusive military response to a form of containment=rapproche-
ment which recognized the inextricable links between security issues
and other political, economic and social matters. In other words, even
if progress could be made on political, constitutional and security
issues, the underlying community divisions will still exist and need
to be addressed. Any progress at the political level, therefore, needed
to be consolidated by government initiatives to bring about equality,
promote reconciliation and mutual respect for separate cultures and
traditions—in short, to create a community that accommodates
people’s aspirations and traditions. This has been referred to as the
‘hearts and minds’ strategy, central to which are policies aimed at
improving community relations and providing equality of opport-
unity and equity of treatment. Specifically, the NIO saw this as a
means of ‘wooing’ non-Republican Catholics, supporting moderate
Nationalist politics in the form of the Social Democratic and Labour
Party (SDLP), and stemming the rising electoral endorsement of
Sinn Fe´in.
Although failure appeared to be the one constant, the search for a
political settlement produced several attempts by successive govern-
ments. The path towards achieving peace, stability and prosperity
was littered with false dawns, acrimonious exchanges and mistrust,
punctuated regularly by continuing terrorist outrages on both sides.
The role played by the British state as a neutral broker is highly con-
tested in their quest to achieve a political settlement. In fact, far from
an independent arbiter, the British Government has been accused of
being a protagonist in the conflict. Nı´ Aolain’s research into 350
deaths caused by agents of the state between 196994 illustrates this,
as does Rolston’s work in which ‘collusion’ and state violence are
seen as barriers to political development.18
It was not until 1982 that the Northern Ireland Secretary of State
proposed ‘rolling devolution’ under which an elected Northern
Ireland Assembly would gradually assume executive powers in pro-
portion to politicians’ willingness to share responsibility.19 Although
all parties fought the elections to the assembly, the Nationalists
(SDLP and Sinn Fe´in) boycotted it in protest against any initiative
that sought only internal solutions (that is, excluding Dublin) to
Northern Ireland’s problems and Unionists’ willingness to work
only on quasi-majoritarian terms. With no acceptable proposals
for devolved structures emerging from the assembly and electoral
support for Sinn Fe´in increasing at the expense of the SDLP, the
British and Irish Governments signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement
in 1985.
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Reflecting on the period preceding the Anglo-Irish Agreement,
O’Day commented:
Violence was endemic but had receded from the levels of the mid-
1970s . . . . British governments increasingly sought to manage the crisis
through bilateral diplomacy with the Dublin regime . . .While the strat-
egy paid dividends in terms of Anglo-Irish relations, it did not end ter-
rorism and it exacerbated concerns with the Unionist community.20
The significant reduction in violence during this period has been as
a result of a number of factors according to O’Duffy. As the security
forces improved their intelligence gathering and assumed greater
powers to tackle terrorism, the IRA moved to a more covert cell
structure to improve its effectiveness. As a direct consequence, the
security forces adopted quasi-legal or illegal operations (‘shoot-to-
kill’ tactics, collusion with Loyalist paramilitaries, forced interroga-
tions and the use of ‘supergrasses’) to tackle terrorism. At the same
time, the Republican movement developed its political machinery fol-
lowing the community support engendered by the hunger strike pro-
test in the early 1980s. According to O’Duffy, security policy during
this period was dictated by three main considerations: reducing viol-
ence to ‘acceptable’ levels; appeasing Unionists demands to defeat the
IRA; and marginalizing paramilitaries in an effort to bolster political
progress between constitutional parties.21
Unionists were incensed that the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement had
been negotiated without consulting the Unionist majority, formally
incorporated an ‘Irish dimension’, and had the status of international
law. The two main Unionist parties (UUP and Democratic Unionist
Party) engaged in a campaign of political disruption and demonstra-
tions that failed to rescind the Agreement, and their relationship with
government ministers plummeted to an all-time low. Morrow argued
that the Anglo-Irish Agreement also created difficulties for Sinn
Fe´in by bolstering the SDLP and constitutional nationalism.22
The political momentum generated by Sinn Fe´in from the hunger
strikes had evaporated and led Republicans to rethink their political
and military options. This new thinking was captured by their emerg-
ing conviction that the conflict in Northern Ireland could not
be resolved by military means alone—one which would transform
their approach from a policy of ‘Brits Out’ to endorsing the principle
of consent.
Thereafter, commentators disagree over the precise time at which
a=the ‘peace process’ can be dated with confidence (to say nothing
of the reasons of its emergence), although revulsion at the Remem-
brance Day bombing in Enniskillen in 1987 appeared to foster a
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climate of accommodation, hitherto largely lacking, among some key
politicians. Certainly, the results of the local government elections in
1989 marked a turning point in local government bringing a degree of
moderation (always a relative term in Ulster) not unrelated to the
decline in representation from the political extremes. Interparty polit-
ical talks commenced in March 1991, to find a means by which
substantial powers and responsibilities might be returned to locally
elected representatives. Although these became mired in procedural
and substantive wrangling, and breaking down in November 1992,
they set down tentative parameters within which any future moves
to a settlement would need to be located.
Desperate to prevent a dangerous vacuum from emerging, and
reflecting the political will of the then British Prime Minister (John
Major) and Irish Taoiseach (Albert Reynolds), the two governments
seized the initiative by issuing a joint communique´, the Downing
Street (Joint) Declaration (December 1993). In making explicit what
was already widely assumed, the British government’s announcement
that it has ‘no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern
Ireland’ represented a powerful public statement designed to neutra-
lize charges that it was engaged in colonial repression when, in truth,
what was afoot amounted to a ‘psychological withdrawal from
Ireland prefiguring political and military disengagement’.23 That such
beliefs still lingered in some Republican circles appeared altogether
misplaced in a post-war Cold War global environment.
The Joint Declaration, set alongside a flurry of secret discussions
that included an unpublished peace plan devised by the SDLP and
Sinn Fe´in, acted as a catalyst for the first IRA cease fire on 31 August
1994. This was subsequently followed (14 October 1994) by a recipro-
cal cessation of violence from the Combined Loyalist Military Com-
mand, an umbrella group comprising the Ulster Volunteer Force, the
Ulster Defence Association and the Red Hand Commandos. The IRA
announcement claimed its cessation was in recognition of the ‘poten-
tial of the current situation and in order to enhance the democratic
peace process’. The Loyalists, in turn, stated that their cease fire
was ‘completely dependent upon the continued IRA cessation, since
the Republican cease fire has yet to be declared permanent’.
The two governments published ‘Frameworks for the Future’ (the
Frameworks Documents) in February 1995. Partly through chor-
eography, partly by individual protagonists ‘testing the water’
through unilateral gestures, the peace process inched forward until
the momentum stalled in February 1996 when the IRA ended its
cease fire in dramatic tragic fashion, before being regenerated in
May 1997 following Labour’s landslide general election victory.
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Anxious to avoid a repetition of earlier talks in which discussion of
substantive issues frequently fell victim to procedural foot-dragging,
the government set a firm timetable for the new round of talks. None-
theless, while the details were debated ad nauseum, the broad outline
was clear, being based on the notion of ‘Three Strands’ (internal,
north-south, east-west) plus steps to ensure phased ‘normalization’
through policing reform, weapons decommissioning, relaxation of
security policy, prisoner releases, and an ‘equality agenda’ placed
on a statutory footing. The subsequent Agreement reached on Good
Friday (April 1998) was ratified in a referendum on 22 May 1998.
‘Ostensibly a democratic device, referendums allow for blunt major-
itarianism and have a disastrous record in attempting to ‘resolve’
complex ethno national conflicts around the world’.24 Thus, the ref-
erendum question was devised in such a way as to minimize the
dangers of majoritarianism by garnering cross-community support
as distinct from the last plebiscite (the Border Poll of 1973), while
being simultaneously replicated in the Irish Republic (though not
Great Britain). In an exceptionally high turnout of 951,845 (80.9
per cent), the ‘Yes’ vote was 676,966 (71.12 per cent), with the ‘No’
vote being 274,879 (28.88 per cent). On 25 June 1998, elections to
the new Northern Ireland Assembly were held.
New Institutional Arrangements
The Good Friday Agreement was designed to bring peace to the
divided society of Northern Ireland and mark a new dimension in
the way it was governed. In the sixth year of the post-Agreement
era, however, important institutions have been suspended and aspects
of the process appear to have relapsed. Early optimism has evapo-
rated as promises have gone unfulfilled. Nevertheless, for the foresee-
able future, the Agreement remains the only realistic alternative to
continued Direct Rule. Even if substantially revised, the core princi-
ples (revolving around the Three Strands and the consent principle)
seem set to remain central to any reformulated or renegotiated ver-
sion that may arise following elections.
The Belfast Agreement involved a radical departure from the
devolution in existence from 192172. No longer would Northern
Ireland be ‘hermetically sealed from outside influence’.25 Direct
Rule had signaled an irrevocable shift in its governance for, while
not proving the temporary expedient hoped for by London, it was
clear that restoring the status quo ante of a majoritarian Stormont
was no longer a credible alternative. Thus, although the Belfast
Devolution, Governance and the Peace Process 601
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Agreement affirmed that Northern Ireland should remain within
the UK so long as that was the wish of the people living there,
both governments would give effect to arrangements for a ‘United’
Ireland if that should become the wish of the people of Northern
Ireland. The Irish government undertook to amend its 1937
Constitution (Articles 2 and 3) to reflect this principle of consent,
while the British government agreed to introduce legislation to do
likewise.
Specifically, the Belfast Agreement created new devolved demo-
cratic institutions. There is a 108-strong Assembly elected by the
single transferable vote (STV) form of proportional representation.
The number of seats was a product of pre-Agreement negotiations
during which concerns were expressed that if the demands of the
smaller Loyalist parties (Progressive Unionist Party=Ulster Demo-
cratic Party) were not met, their cease fires would not be sustained.
Hence, early discussions about having five-member parliamentary
(Westminster) constituency elections (given a 90-person assembly)
moved to agreeing six members per constituency, resulting in
108 seats in the new assembly. This contrasts with a 129-member
Scottish Parliament which has three times the population of North-
ern Ireland and broadly similar powers. As Wilford and Wilson
point out, the combination of using the STV electoral system
and efforts to ensure Loyalist representation in the assembly pro-
vided a disincentive for extremist electoral behavior.26 On the other
hand, the expressed intent of the Agreement is to provide a demo-
cratically elected assembly in Northern Ireland which ‘is inclusive
in its membership’.
From the assembly, a first minister, deputy first minister and 10
(later 12) other members were appointed to form the Northern
Ireland Executive. Together, both institutions constituted a power-
sharing arrangement in the classic consociational mould albeit with
novel features designed (depending upon one’s political perspective)
to ensure certain outcomes did (or did not) eventuate, involving
weighted majorities and cross-community support. While not being
a formal ‘grand coalition’, the Executive was tantamount to a perma-
nent ‘rainbow coalition government’ drawn from the assembly using
the d’Hondt method. The positions of the first and deputy first min-
isters are inextricably linked. The Agreement required there to be a
committee for each of the main executive functions of the Northern
Ireland administration. The number of government departments
was part of the negotiations mainly between the UUP and the SDLP
during late 1998. Concurrently, Northern Ireland’s government
departments were reconfigured from 6 to 10 (see Table 1), as well
602 P. Carmichael and C. Knox
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as a new Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister
(OFMDFM). The Northern Ireland Office remained in situ to deal
with those matters reserved (policing, prisons, security and criminal
justice) as well as in the event of a suspension.
Under devolution, ministers have full executive authority in their
respective areas of responsibility, a travesty of democracy according
to the Agreement’s implacable opponents such as Ian Paisley’s
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) when faced with Sinn Fe´in minis-
ters holding portfolios in health and education. There are checks on
ministerial autonomy but they appear weak; in theory, the assembly
could sack a minister though that seems inconceivable given the
assembly arithmetic. Additionally, a powerful committee flanks each
department, being ‘charged to ‘‘advise and assist’’ each of the depart-
ments with which they are associated ‘‘in the formulation of policy’’;
in addition, they may initiate primary legislation’.27
In addition, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and its associated
secretariat were abolished. The Agreement signaled the creation of
a new North-South Ministerial Council (and other all-Ireland
implementation bodies) established under a new British-Irish Agree-
ment, and a British-Irish Council (‘Council of the Isles’) and a
British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (see Table 2).
Any analysis of the situation in Northern Ireland must take into
consideration that the political reality of the province is shaped not
Table 1. Central government department structure under direct rule and
devolution
Old structure New structure
NIO Central Secretariat NIO Central Secretariat
Office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister
Agriculture Agriculture and Rural Development
Economic Development Culture, Arts and Leisure
Education Education
Environment Enterprise, Trade and Investment
Finance and Personnel Environment
Health and Social Services Finance and Personnel
Health and Social Services and Public Safety
Higher and Further Education, Training and
Employment (subsequently retitled ‘Employment
and Learning’)
Regional Development
Social Development
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only by the British government but also by reference to the Irish
Government. The desire of ‘integrationists’ that Northern Ireland
was ‘as British as Finchley’ and thus should be fully integrated into
the UK—always highly unlikely even under the avowedly ‘Unionist’
Thatcher governments—has looked increasingly untenable since 1997
and Labour’s constitutional reforms in Great Britain. At the same
time, however, its position has never been directly comparable to that
of Scotland and Wales. The Agreement’s quasi-federal tendencies and
its provisional nature, as distinct from finality (namely, the prospect
of rolling referendums on the question of an irreversible secession
from the UK and (re-)union with southern Ireland), confers upon
Northern Ireland a greater autonomy that has been accorded to
any other part of the UK.28
Beyond the ‘first order’ institutions, the Belfast Agreement
involves a twin track approach. One element includes a review of
public administration arrangements in Northern Ireland incorporat-
ing local government, quangos and agencies (but importantly not
the 11 government departments). The second element has three aims:
first, to develop more formal arrangements with the voluntary and
community sector in the decision-making processes of government
departments; second, the institutionalization of social partnership
through the Civic Forum, established under the Belfast Agreement;
and finally, the emergence of local partnership arrangements in a
number of important functional areas (health, community safety
and ‘well-being’).29
Taken as a whole, the institutional arrangements fashioned by the
Belfast Agreement have attracted considerable comment. The new
governmental architecture of the British Isles entails a series of insti-
tutional connections that represent an interesting species of federal-
ism. Thus, the exclusivist demands of traditional Ulster unionism
or Irish nationalism are oddly out of place in what Elazar contended
Table 2. North-south institutions
Implementation bodies Areas of co-operation
Inland Waterways Agriculture
Food Safety Education
Trade and Business Development Environment
Special EU Programmes Health
Language (Irish and Ulster Scots) Transport
Aquaculture and Marine Matters Tourism
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was an emerging new paradigm. According to Elazar, nation-states
will not disappear but
will be overlaid by a variety of federal arrangements of a confederal
character . . . in a network of Agreements that are not only militarily
and economically binding for de facto reasons but are also becoming
constitutionally binding, de jure. This overlay increasingly reflects
what was called state sovereignty, and forces states into various
combinations of self-rule and shared rule to enable them to survive
at all. That means federalism, understood in the broadest sense as
a genus involving combinations of self-rule and shared rule rather
than as the one species of federalism accepted in modern times—
federation.30
Together, therefore, the three strands of the Belfast Agreement,
according to O’Leary, amount to an internal consociation built
within overarching confederal and federal institutions;
it has imaginative elements of co-sovereignty; it promises a novel
model of ‘double protection’; and it rests on a bargain derived from
diametrically conflicting hopes about its likely long-run outcome,
but that may not destabilize it.31
Certainly, in administrative terms, Northern Ireland is the living
embodiment of ‘variable geometry’, confirming Rhodes’ contention
that the UK possesses a ‘differentiated polity’.32 Throughout its
history, the governance of Northern Ireland (both internally, and
in respect to its place within the UK) has exhibited profound differ-
ences with Great Britain (itself a far from homogenous entity). To
that end, just as Direct Rule in no way implied that Northern Ireland
was governed like the rest of the UK (for nowhere in Great Britain
would reference be made to ‘Direct Rule’), so devolution simply
underscores the sense of difference. Indeed, the pattern of the UK’s
territorial management has become increasingly variegated as a
consequence of devolution in Great Britain, too. The Belfast Agree-
ment was fortuitously timed since it ‘enabled the Blair government to
tie Northern Ireland into its wider constitutional reform project’.33 If
the provisions of the Belfast Agreement are permitted to make them-
selves felt, the differentiation of UK governance will be entrenched
further still (see Table 3). As the imposition of Direct Rule demon-
strated, short of transforming the UK into a federal polity, when
an intergovernmental conflict becomes insoluble, Westminster’s
(legal) ability to prevail over a subordinate may confer supremacy
but it cannot automatically ensure its legitimacy among the populace.
Rather, it can sow the seeds of discontent that may lead to the
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ultimate fragmentation of the very union that the devolution was pur-
ported to strengthen.
DEVOLUTION–A CONTRIBUTION TO ‘PEACE AND
STABILITY’?
An important consideration is what contribution (if any) have the
devolved arrangements made to the creation and maintenance of
peace and stability, the British government’s stated intentions for
Northern Ireland. Aside from the Northern Ireland Assembly being
a visible manifestation of the implementation of the Belfast Agree-
ment, what were the expectations for devolved government and to
what extent have these been fulfilled? The transfer of power was
devolved to the assembly and its executive committee of ministers in
December 1999. In the autumn of 2000, a survey of the population34
Table 3. Levels of governance and institutional arrangements
Tier / Level Geographic space Typical institution
International
(Supranational=
Intergovernmental)
Europe European Union
Bi-National
(Intergovernmental)
British Isles British-Irish Council
(‘Council of the Isles’)
British-Irish Intergovernmental
Conference (replaces Anglo-Irish
Agreement)
Extra-National
(Intergovernmental)
Northern Ireland=
Republic of
Ireland
North-South Ministerial Council
National United Kingdom=
Republic of
Ireland
Westminster=Oireachtas
Regional Northern Ireland Northern Ireland Assembly
Subregional County=Other Area Boards (e.g., Health &
Social Services Boards;
Education & Library Boards)
Local District=City=
Borough
Local Authorities
(e.g., Belfast City Council)
Sublocal Parish=Community=
Locality
Parish=Community Councils=Local
Partnerships (e.g., North Belfast
Partnership Board)
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was asked whether devolution would help secure peace in Northern
Ireland. Overall, some 40 per cent of the respondents agreed or
strongly agreed that devolution would help secure peace in Northern
Ireland and 24 per cent disagreed or strongly disagreed. The results,
disaggregated by religion are shown in Table 4.
The data suggest that there was an initial optimism about the pro-
spects of devolution helping to secure peace. It is also clear that the
data from Catholics were much more sanguine than Protestants.
Interestingly, when asked in the same survey, what was the most
important day-to-day issue for the assembly to deal with, almost 50
per cent of respondents considered ‘the continuing violence’ as the
principal concern for members of the legislative assembly. This,
despite the fact that policing, security policy and criminal justice
are among the excepted and reserved matters for which the Northern
Ireland secretary has direct responsibility.
Some 2 years later with the assembly suspended for the fourth time
(in October 2002), public attitudes on the contribution of the
assembly were sought.37 When asked what the assembly had
achieved, overall 27 per cent of respondents claimed that it had
achieved ‘a lot’, 54 per cent said ‘a little’ and 19 per cent ‘nothing
at all’. Table 5 shows these data disaggregated further by religion.
Again, Catholics were more positive about the achievements of the
assembly than Protestants. Analyzing Tables 4 and 5 together would
Table 4. Devolution will help secure peace (by religion)1
Catholic per cent Protestant per cent
No religion
per cent
Agree and strongly agree 61 31 28
Neither 31 39 35
Disagree and strongly disagree 8 30 37
1Data exclude ‘can’t choose’ and ‘missing’ categories.
Table 5. What has the assembly achieved (by religion)1
Catholic per cent Protestant per cent No religion per cent
A lot 37 18 29
A little 52 56 51
Nothing at all 11 26 20
1Data exclude ‘don’t know’ category.
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suggest that devolution as manifest through the assembly has had
limited success in its contribution to securing peace, with a significant
difference of opinion between the two main religious blocs.
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE ‘PEACE PROCESS’
AND DEVOLUTION ON GOVERNANCE
The impact of the ‘peace process’ and subsequent devolution can
be assessed by reference to several different levels: central (provincial)
government and the civil service; the north-south dimension; subre-
gional governance (local government and quangos); community
governance and civic partnerships; and the European dimension. Each
is considered in turn.
Central (Provincial) Government in Northern Ireland and
the Civil Service
Predictably, the intermittent nature of devolution has plagued
attempts to forge ahead with any semblance of a new, distinct policy
agenda for Northern Ireland. While the new administration produced
its Programme for Government,38 it has been remarkable how little
divergence there has been from past practice ‘given the mantra of
devolved ministers that they were out to ‘‘make a difference’’ as com-
pared to direct rule’.39 Wilford and Wilson observed:
The document said 71 per cent of actions identified in the pro-
gramme—which, though annually iterated has had a 3-year rolling
timescale—had been achieved, or ‘substantially’ achieved or, at least,
were ‘on track’. Otherwise, the report is marked by continuity rather
than change.40
Wilford and Wilson attributed this to:
weak policy capacity at Stormont (concentrated in a tiny Economic
Policy Unit in the OFMDFM), the crowding out of policy innovation
by Northern Ireland’s mistrustful audit culture and the virtual absence
of any significant policy input from parties with no reliable positioning
on any left-right governance spectrum.41
They concluded:
The lurking paradox is that if the package of legislative and policy
reforms proves to be welcome, then direct rule may become less objec-
tionable, particularly among Unionists. As one advisor to Mr Trimble
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put it, albeit privately and somewhat rhetorically, ‘What’s the differ-
ence between direct rule and devolution? Direct rule is popular!’42
Apart from UK Departments of State that dealt with ‘reserved’ and
‘excepted’ matters, and whose staff belonged to the ‘Imperial’ or
Home Civil Service (UKCS), civil administration within Northern
Ireland (as in all of Ireland before Partition) has always rested with
a wholly separate Civil Service—the Northern Ireland Civil Service
(NICS).43 Thus, under devolution, Direct Rule and now devolution-
plus, NICS has continued as a ‘unique example of a regional civil ser-
vice within the UK, completely separate from the UK Civil Service’.44
The network of government within Northern Ireland formed a terri-
torial policy community, broadly though not fully congruent with
Scottish and Welsh arrangements.45 Northern Ireland Civil Service
has never been directly comparable with the home civil service, as
it had different functional responsibilities although it has tradition-
ally followed UKCS precepts on appointment and promotion.
Throughout Direct Rule, there was an enhanced role for the
bureaucracy in containing the Northern Ireland conflict. ForMorrow:
the emphasis on administration as opposed to representation has
increased the scope for civil service influence over policy. Given the
small size of Northern Ireland, the result has been a tight and intimate
policy network dominated by administrative interests. The inability of
local parties to influence policy has not, however, abolished the need
of the government to stay in contact with the governed. As a result,
the civil service has increasingly developed its own extensive and direct
relationship with numerous groups and agencies.46
By the 1990 s, the triumph of technocracy appeared irrefutable.
Despite protests that theirs was an unwanted power, the fact remains
that the senior civil service enjoyed disproportionate influence over
the development, formulation and implementation of public policy
in Northern Ireland (through, for example, the Policy Coordinating
Committee (PCC); the PCC has since been replaced by a civil service
management board). As Wilford and Wilson have remarked, the
technocratic tenor of government has remained evident.47
Irrespective of its departmental configuration, the NICS has
continued to serve its political masters, regardless of the consti-
tutional status and prevailing governmental arrangements of
Northern Ireland. While society has been disfigured and corrupted
by intercommunal sectarian violence, everyday public administration
has continued to function and maintain public services. Under the
long period of one party rule at Stormont, there is some evidence
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to suggest that the ethos of the NICS became tainted by the realities
of its operational environment.48 That is, the merit principle fell vic-
tim to an implicit (if not explicit) policy that discouraged the
advancement of women (especially when married) and the appoint-
ment and promotion of Catholics to senior positions. No Catholic
was appointed as a permanent secretary until the 1960s (contrasting
with much higher levels of Catholic participation in the ‘Imperial’
Civil Service). Thereafter, payroll demographics ensured that historic
underrepresentation of Catholics and women would endure until cor-
rective steps on appointments and promotion could begin impacting
on the gender and religious complexion of the senior echelons of the
NICS. By the late 1990s, in large measure due to a Fair Employment
Agency investigation and subsequent creation of an Equal Opportu-
nities Unit within NICS, religious imbalances had been largely elimi-
nated leaving gender as the most glaring discrepancy, as outlined in
Table 6.
As well as its internal arrangements for ensuring equality in its
staffing, government has moved to augment Northern Ireland’s
extensive fair employment legislation with measures designed to
‘mainstream’ equality provisions, thereby ensuring that it satisfies
equality considerations. In 1990, Policy Appraisal and Fair Treat-
ment (PAFT) required that equality considerations be inserted into
the policy-making process. Policy Appraisal and Fair Treatment
Table 6. Trends in overall composition of the NICS by gender and religion
(by per cent)
Male Female Protestant Catholic
1987 59.8 40.2 62.5 37.5
1989 59.0 41.0 61.6 38.4
1991 57.7 42.3 61.2 38.8
1993 56.6 43.4 60.4 39.6
1995 55.3 44.7 59.7 40.3
1997 53.4 46.6 59.3 40.7
1999 52.0 48.0 58.6 41.4
2002 50.8 49.2 56.0 44.0
Note: Figures for Protestant and Catholic are adjusted to reflect the proportion of staff
recorded as ‘nondeclared’ or ‘nondenomination’. In 1987, the ND category was 11 per cent
of all NICS staff; in 2002, the corresponding figure was 3.5 per cent.
Source: Equal Opportunities Unit, Department of Finance and Personnel, Northern Ireland
Government.
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was joined in 1991 by a second initiative, Targeting Social Need,
designed to narrow the disparities between relative poverty levels
within the two communities. Following the Belfast Agreement,
both measures were subsumed by section 75 of the Northern Ire-
land Act, 1998. Legislation greatly extended the equality agenda
to encompass multiple categories (religion and political opinion;
gender, race and ethnicity, age, disability, marital status, sexual
orientation, and those with dependants) along with the creation
of a new Equality Commission subsuming all the previous statu-
tory equality agencies.49
The North-South Dimension
Unionists have long complained about a growing (albeit exagger-
ated) participation by Irish civil servants in the internal affairs of
Northern Ireland following the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Ironically,
forging closer relations with their southern counterparts proved
easier during Direct Rule than during either the previous Stormont
era or, indeed, since the intermittent restoration of devolution in
1999. The motivation for such developments is both political and
pragmatic. The realization that resolving Northern Ireland’s pro-
blems demanded more than an ‘internal’ solution as well as the not
illegitimate contention that Dublin ‘spoke for’ minority Nationalist
sentiment in the North, prompted the UK government to warm
towards the republic’s government. Relations were more cordial
thanks to the shared membership of, and—on Northern Ireland at
least—a shared agenda within, the EC=EU, along with enhanced
levels of cross-border security cooperation.50
Interestingly, even in the period of suspended devolution, north-
south bodies have operated on a ‘care and maintenance’ basis, with
the role of the Northern Ireland Executive being filled by the Direct
Rule administration.51 Thus, despite a widespread assumption that
the lifespan of the implementation bodies would be seriously compro-
mised by a long suspension, the bodies have thus been able to survive
and continue their work. Indeed, decisions have been made in quite
significant areas (including important appointments, policy matters
and budgetary approval) on the basis of Agreement between the rel-
evant minister in Dublin and his or her counterpart in the British
administration in Belfast.52
Perhaps this foreshadows the shape of things to come—creeping
bi-governmentalism, albeit falling short of the joint-sovereignty
speculated upon by some pundits. Coakley argued that it does
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provide a new momentum for the British-Irish Intergovernmental
Conference. He noted that the Agreement gives Dublin a voice in
nondevolved matters—effectively, a considerable say in Northern
Ireland’s ‘internal affairs’, and a widening one during periods of sus-
pension. Coakley concluded that the impact of suspension in Strands
2 and 3 has been less pronounced for while the Agreement said the
Northern Ireland Assembly and North-South Ministerial Council
were mutually interdependent, and that ‘one cannot function success-
fully without the other’, the council and its associated bodies have
continued operating, while similarly, so have the British-Irish
bodies.53
Sub-regional Governance (Local Government and Quangos)
Ordinarily, a system of elected local government might have
afforded some opportunity for bypassing Northern Ireland’s consti-
tutional imbroglio. However, once again, it was a quirk of history
that ensured that the ‘permanent impermanence’ of Direct Rule effec-
tively embargoed any meaningful progress on promoting peace, rec-
onciliation and stability via local government until the late 1980s.54
In any jurisdiction, the role of any (devolved) regional government
is inextricably bound up with the fate of local government but
especially so in Northern Ireland. Heated disputes over aspects of
local authority behavior had plunged the province into the very civil
unrest that brought Stormont into disrepute and that led, ultimately,
to its demise.
The ensuing removal of functions from elected local authorities
and suspension of Stormont required vesting responsibilities with
other bodies—with quangos. Since 1970, quangos have been the
mainstay of Northern Ireland’s governmental architecture. Ordi-
narily, as Kingdom observed, quangos ‘offer governments some
extremely useful facilities, enabling them to wash their hands of
embarrassing matters, disclaim responsibility for unpopular policies,
evade parliamentary scrutiny and keeps areas off the political
agenda’.55 Certainly, as a tool for administering and delivering public
services, quangos have proved valuable in the quagmire of Northern
Ireland’s sectarian divisions. Indeed, in terms of consumer satisfac-
tion, impartiality and delivery, the performance of many quangos
excels the rather lackluster and often shameful record of former local
authorities. Nonetheless, while being an understandable administrat-
ive device in the exacting conditions of Northern Ireland, as Skelcher
remarked, the democratic deficit that quangos create ‘reflects a fun-
damental weakness in the ability of citizens to be involved in
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the structures with which society governs itself’.56 As the Executive’s
Programme for Government signaled:
We have inherited from the last 30 years a wide range of public bodies.
Their organization and structure reflected the needs of those times. They
helped maintain services at a time of very limited public accountability.
But now that devolution has been achieved; there is a need for change
that will provide not only greater accountability, but should ensure that
organizations that deliver many key services throughout Northern Ire-
land are more coherently organised. It is therefore important that we
set about a major process of reform in central government.57
Reconnecting citizens and those in government has been a recur-
rent theme across western democracies in recent years. For Northern
Ireland, while devolution represents a decisive attempt to end such an
estrangement, it is only the first of several necessary steps. Moreover,
despite their creditable showing, as a device for political manage-
ment, many quangos may well have outlived their usefulness in
Northern Ireland. Denuded of the harsh realities of decision-making,
local politicians have been able to snipe from the sidelines and
indulge the luxury of opposition, free of the burdens of office.58 As
well as the trappings, devolution invests them with the burdens—
and unenviable obligations—of office, to make the difficult choices
within finite budgets, which previously rested with Direct Rule
ministers.
Devolution also signaled a green light for significant reform of
public administration. Having been in place for over 30 years, the
current system—itself the result of partial implementation of an ear-
lier reorganization—is long overdue for change. Questions of legit-
imacy and accountability are accompanied by concern over the
efficiency and quality of services given the plethora of bodies that
exists. Simply, Northern Ireland is ‘over-governed’—or at the least,
over-administered.59 Not surprisingly, there have been repeated
calls for streamlining. Consequently, a major examination of the
system of public administration has been underway since mid-June
2002.
The origins of the Review of Public Administration (RPA) in
Northern Ireland are to be found in the Programme for Government
in which the Northern Ireland Executive pledged from the outset to
‘lead the most effective and accountable form of government in
Northern Ireland’.60 The Executive inherited a system of nondepart-
mental public bodies responsible for major functions such as edu-
cation, health and housing which together consumed two-thirds of
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their devolved budget. Its terms of reference are: ‘to review the
existing arrangements for the accountability, administration and
delivery of public services in Northern Ireland, and to bring forward
options for reform which are consistent with the arrangements and
principles of the Belfast Agreement, within an appropriate frame-
work of political and financial accountability’.
Despite the present suspension of the devolved arrangements,
Direct Rule ministers have permitted the work of the review team
to continue in the hope if not expectation that once devolution is
restored, the momentum of reform can be maintained.
Community Governance and Civic Partnerships
Throughout the Direct Rule period, the failure to secure a viable
devolved settlement encouraged ministers to engage with other social
partners as a means of seeking to legitimize policy-making in any
environment devoid of an elected regional government. Partly, the
logjam on political developments at the macro level encouraged
individuals who might otherwise ordinarily be interested in party
politics to organize and engage with nonpolitical bodies such as com-
munity and voluntary groups. Over time, Northern Ireland has
acquired an impressive array of such groups, far in excess of compar-
ably sized regions elsewhere—some 4,5005,000 voluntary organiza-
tions alone. The richness and diversity of this ‘third’ sector (that is,
neither public nor private) prompted government to develop partner-
ship arrangements in the hope of increasing popular participation
in the policy process as well as encouraging cross-community co-
operation on (the very wide) areas of common concern as a means
of overcoming (or bypassing) the wide party-political divisions.
Starting in earnest during the 1990s, partnership arrangements
were encouraged by ministers in local government. Contiguous with
each local council area, district partnerships brought together elected
representatives from the constituent local authority, members of
statutory boards (these provide inter alia health, education, housing),
and representatives from the ‘social partners’ (community and volun-
tary groups, businesses, trades unions and churches). These partner-
ships proved instrumental in the formulation of local priorities
relatively free (though not completely) from the otherwise more frac-
tious environs of many council chambers, as well as the disbursement
of monies associated with the European Commission’s (Delors) Pro-
gramme for Peace and Reconciliation. Such local compacts in North-
ern Ireland had not, hitherto, been replicated elsewhere in the UK.61
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The transition from Direct Rule to devolution has heralded a
reinforcement of the trend. In its Programme for Government, the
Executive stated its vision:
Regeneration of our society—in the fullest sense—means that we have
to tackle issues of equality and human rights, poverty and social disad-
vantage, renewal of the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods, sustain-
ing and enhancing local communities and improving cross community
relations. . . . In tackling these issues we have the advantage of a vibrant
and extensive community and voluntary sector which already makes
significant and critical contributions to many areas of life. A key chal-
lenge will be to build on this community capacity and to involve it in
policies and programmes aimed at strengthening our community well
being.62
Osborne and McLaughlin conclude that local compacts have ‘the
potential to give substance to the rhetoric of community governance,
by providing explicit processes for the community to impact upon
policy formulation and service management at a local level’.63
The European Dimension
The idea of ‘Europe’ and the unfolding process of European inte-
gration through the medium of the European Union (EU) serve as an
umbrella under which the recurrent tensions within Northern Ireland
have been outplayed. While the EU offered its services in brokering a
deal within Northern Ireland, the reality has been that only its good-
will and, more tangibly, its largesse, have played a direct part. Never-
theless, the implicit impact of the wider European (and indeed global)
dimension has fostered a changing environment wherein negotiations
were conducted and to which, perhaps subliminally, the actors were
responding. Much of that impact is perhaps symbolic, even abstract,
but is no less relevant for all that, in the land where flags, emblems
and the associated atavistic trappings of tribalism are so potent.
For some commentators, the Belfast Agreement typifies a new
post-Nationalist era when both Unionists and Nationalists are criti-
cally reviewing ideas of nation, state and identity.64 Put simply, it
was hoped that the emergence of a shared European identity might
transcend and render obsolete ancient enmities. Despite an enlarging
EU of regions with fast-disappearing internal borders, constitutional
disputes of the type that beset Northern Ireland continue, and so this
main goal has not been achieved thus far.
Nonetheless, the influence of the European dimension has the
potential to work in different ways and at different levels. Formally,
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the EU has no direct role in Northern Ireland—EU business is the
competence of the relevant member state (i.e., the UK government).
Nonetheless, with both the UK and the Irish governments having
acceded concurrently, the EU provides an additional forum in which
diplomatic links can be created and differences settled. Additionally,
all three Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from Northern
Ireland have assiduously exploited available EU resources for the bet-
terment of life in the province (Northern Ireland retained its ‘Objective
1’ status long after its automatic entitlement had ceased). They were
instrumental in securing the (‘Delors’) Programme for Peace and Re-
conciliation Programme of 500MEuro to help bolster the peace process
and promote reconciliation. Moreover, even before devolution, like
other regions in the UK and across the EU, Northern Ireland had
established a more permanent representation in Brussels, seeking to
promote itself as a ‘forward and outward-looking region’.65 The
House of Lords considered the devolved administrations in the UK
to be better placed than counterparts elsewhere.66 The move was a
pragmatic recognition not only of the shifting locus of power from
nation-state to the supranational level, but desirous also in continuing
to accrue the benefits that EU membership has yielded for a tra-
ditional, relatively deprived part of the EU such as Northern Ireland.
CONCLUSIONS
For too long, political discourse in Northern Ireland has been
characterized by a zero-sum game form of analysis, wherein gains
for one side must imply corresponding offsetting losses by the other.
However, the problems that confront the community as a whole in
Northern Ireland frequently go far beyond narrow and exclusive cul-
tural, religious or national identities. Longer-term stability warrants
institutions of government (broadly defined) that can effectively
deliver the range of public policy outcomes desired by citizens irres-
pective of background or affinitive ideology. Either=or ‘solutions’—
full integration, full reunification, or majoritarian devolution—seem
destined to fail since none can ever command the sufficiency of
cross-community consent required for it to enjoy popular legitimacy
and authority. Superficially, at the heart of the Belfast Agreement is
an antinomy—Unionists (and anti-Agreement Republicans) contend
that it maintains the union by copper-fastening partitions while
Nationalists=Republicans (and anti-Agreement Unionists) contend
that it loosens the union and advances the cause of Irish reunifica-
tion. Clearly, when couched in such stark terms, these diametrically
opposed conclusions cannot be simultaneously correct. However, this
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is precisely why the Belfast Agreement was designed to transcend
such categorical black and white analysis by recognizing ‘the
totality of relationships in these islands’. Mutual recognition and
accommodation, rather than transformation of national and cultural
identities is the order of the day. Though operationalizing it has pro-
ven to be excruciatingly slow leaving a present settlement that is far
from perfect, the Agreement—renegotiated, revised, reconfigured or
not—appears to offer the only credible basis for lasting stability.
While there are serious misgivings, especially among Unionists,
about devolution, these tend to concern its operationalization, rather
than its intrinsic conceptual attractions. The stated positions of the
various political parties appear to be out of kilter with the general
feeling among the public. Overall, 43 per cent of people in Northern
Ireland support devolution, as compared with only 21 per cent sup-
porting a united Ireland, and fewer still (13 per cent) direct rule or
independence (10 per cent). Support for the Union has fallen during
recent years, though there has not been concomitant growth in com-
mitment to the ideal of a ‘united Ireland’. Rather, ‘the emphasis on
either-or constitutional choices by Northern Ireland’s politicians mis-
read the public mood’.67 In all probability, with the joint guarantors
of London and Dublin, any enduring settlement for Northern Ireland
will involve a form of governance at the heart of which will be a last-
ing commitment to a sharing of power—and identities—of all sec-
tions of the resident population.
Devolution and the associated mechanisms of governance—a
power-sharing Executive, elected assembly, cross-border bodies, a
reformed system of public administration and civic engagement—
are part of the wider mosaic of peace-building. Their implementation
is an attempt to institutionalize stability and copper-fasten a political
settlement. Despite the insidious and ongoing paramilitary violence,
devolved government and reformed local governance arrangements
(not simply because of their popular appeal) build in a degree of elec-
toral accountability that reaffirms the wider desire for long-term
stability and peaceful coexistence, albeit with different long-term
political aspirations.
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